Thus far, Socrates has only shown that disputes over good and evil may cause animosity among the gods: yet, he now claims that these are the only subjects which do so. If we accept even the more blunted version of Socrates's previous premise - that the matters in which conflict drives men to blows likewise rouse the gods - we are forced to accept that disagreements over power and authority, such as incite wars among men, likewise realize strife among the gods. It is clear, then, that dissensions inflaming animosity among the gods do not necessarily concern good and evil, but could also concern power and authority. Socrates has committed the converse fallacy: he has concluded from x(t) ⇒ y(t) that y(t) ⇒ x(t), where here x(t) is the proposition “t is a disagreement concerning good and evil” and y(t) is the proposition “t has the capacity to engender antagonism among the gods.” This is especially interesting given the care with which Socrates will later examine implication relationships to conclude that Euthyphro’s second definition of piety is incoherent. However, this is how we should understand Socrates’s argument.